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WHAT A LOAD OF HOPE: THE POST-RACIAL MIXTAPE
JEREMIAH CHIN*
I get downfor my grandfatherwho took my momma
Made her sit in that seat where white folks ain'twant us to eat
At the tender age of six she was arrestedfor the sit-ins
With that in my blood I was born to be different
That's why I hear new music and Ijust don't befeeling it
Racism's still alive they just be concealing it.'
INTRODUCTION

As a hip-hop producer, Kanye West draws on a huge library of
music to create beats and rhymes that underscore his message. On his
first album, he samples the hook from a Blackjack song, sung by
Michael Bolton, to create the lyrical critique embedded in the track
Never Let Me Down. In the first eight bars of his verse, Kanye West
summons his mother's and grandfather's involvement in the sit-ins of
the civil rights movement, citing and personally engaging a history
that has been diluted with post-racial rhetoric that denies the
persistence of race. But the history alone isn't enough. Kanye West
confronts the recording industry and social standards in two quick
lines: "That's why I hear new music and I just don't be feeling it /
Racism's still alive, they just be concealing it."2 Kanye is openly
* Jeremiah Chin is a J.D. candidate at the Sandra Day O'Connor College of
Law and a Ph.D. candidate in the department of Justice and Social Inquiry, both at
Arizona State University. I would like to thank Dr. Mary Romero, Dr. Bryan
Brayboy, and Jessica Solyom for their help in shaping the ideas and analysis in this
piece. I would also like to thank the members and participants at LatCrit XVI for
listening and commenting on the presentation of this piece. Finally, I would like to
send special thanks to Dr. Sumi Cho for helping to inspire this piece and aiding my
attendance to LatCrit XVI.
1. KANYE WEST, Never Let Me Down, on COLLEGE DROPOUT (Roc-a-Fella

Records 2004) (emphasis added).
2. Id.
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critiquing the lack of open discourse on racism in music and culture,
prefaced with his family's history in the civil rights movement, all
over a sped up and re-tuned sample of Michael Bolton. But while
Kanye samples for his albums and the music charts, the United States
Supreme Court and Arizona State Legislature have been doing their
own version of sampling through post-racial rhetoric in statutes,
propositions, and legal opinions. Pulling from some of the greatest hits
of the civil rights movement, the Supreme Court and Arizona
Legislature have sampled the language of formal equality to mask the
persistence of racism by sampling a familiar tune calling for racial
equality. The hook is catchy and gets the listener nodding. Meanwhile,
the lyrics providing the post-racial rhetoric declare racism is dead and
to think otherwise is a new form of reverse-discrimination.
Recognition of racism in the lives of people of color has been
reduced to only acknowledging individual acts of meanness; ignoring
the systemic and structural discrimination that persists while asserting
that programs meant to enhance the lives and careers of people of
color are, in fact, racist. The hook repeats, the sample plays the sounds
of the civil rights movement, the lyrics spout a post-racial fiction,
masking the all too familiar beat of white supremacy. Unfortunately,
in Arizona this song is not a one hit wonder. Each successive single on
the post-racial mixtape, Senate Bill (S.B.) 1070, House Bill (H.B.)
2281, and Proposition 107, goes platinum and gets amplified,
attempting to drown out the calls for action, coalitions, and responses
from communities of color.
This Comment analyzes how Supreme Court decisions and recent
legislation have used the language of post-racialism to re-center
whiteness through the law. Rather than using explicit racist language,
the post-racial project exploits the language of historical antiracist
efforts to negate experiences with discrimination while continuing a
hostile environment for racial groups and promoting white supremacy
in the United States.
Beginning with Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action, in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke3 and Grutter v.
Bollinger,4 and school desegregation in Parents Involved in

3.
4.

438 U.S. 265 (1978).
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,' this Comment
analyzes how legal constructions of race have gradually dismantled
the legal achievements of the civil rights movement and re-centered
whiteness in the law through post-racial ideology. Beyond the
Supreme Court, recent Arizona legislation such as H.B. 22816 (ending
ethnic studies in high schools) and Proposition 1077 (banning
affirmative action) are symptomatic of the changing legal rhetoric of
race in the United States. Rooted in rhetoric of colorblindness and
individual rights, the three Supreme Court decisions and two pieces of
Arizona legislation outline the dominant narrative of post-racialism in
United States law. Drawing on Critical Race Theory as a theoretical
framework, this Comment uses legal scholar Sumi Cho's definition of
post-racialism to outline the legal narrative from the Supreme Court to
Arizona legislation.8 To consider the implications of post-racial legal
narratives, Critical Race Theory underscores the role of interest
convergence in United States law, forming a legal ideology that is
simultaneously permissive of racist actions and insulated from legal
challenges that strive for racial justice.
I. CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND POST-RACIALISM

Post-racialism and colorblindness are not new to the law, but
evolved from a history of legislation designed to protect oppressed
communities. As Professor Ian Haney Lopez notes, "those who
purposefully seek to use the law to end discrimination or gain
advantages for minority communities, may also substantially though
unwittingly contribute to the legal legitimization of racial domination
and subordination." 9 Statutes, legislators, judges, and common law
help to create racial difference through the law by creating an ideasystem that (1) legitimates race; (2) "help[s] racial categories to
5. 551 U.S. 701 (2006).
6. H.B. 2281, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); see also ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 15-111 to -112 (2010).
7. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 36; ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE, 2010 BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS & JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE REvIEw: PROPOSITION 107 (2010),
availableat www.azsos.gov/election/201 0/info/pubpamphlet/english/prop 107.htm.
8. Sumi Cho, Postracialism,94 IOWA L. REv. 1589, 1594-1600 (2009).
9. IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
107 (10th ed. 2006).
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transcend the sociohistorical contexts in which they develop,"'o
making racial classification seem natural and inherent, rather than
socially constructed; and (3) reifies racial categories to "transform
them into concrete things, making the categories seem natural, rather
than human creations."" To understand the connections between law
and social norms, this Comment uses a Critical Race Theory
framework to address questions of how the modem rhetoric of case
law, initiatives, and statutes have obscured the ongoing role of racism
and discrimination in the United States, while exploiting past civil
rights rhetoric to re-center white supremacy in the law.
Central to Critical Race Theory is the notion that racism is
endemic in the United States. "Racism is normal, not aberrant . . .. [I]t

looks ordinary and natural to persons in the culture" and therefore
formal legal remedies can only address extreme instances of injustice,
ignoring "the business-as-usual forms of racism that people of color
confront every day and that account for much misery, alienation, and
despair."12 Racism is a social construct that takes multiple forms. One
is the more visible, often structural, manifestation of racism in overt
acts of oppression, such as segregation or slavery. But behind the
scenes lurks the larger collection of cultural attitudes towards race that
form the dominant narrative of white supremacy 3 and "racial
subordination [which] maintains and perpetuates the American social
order."' 4

10. Id. at 88.
11. Id. at 91.
12. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, at xvi (2d ed. 2000).
13. The term "white supremacy" includes more than the typical imagery of the
Ku Klux Klan or burning crosses. It implicates whiteness and white privilege that
may create a presumption of worth, heightened social capital, or even obscure
stigma. See generally LOPEZ, supra note 9; Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993). For example, Professor Michelle Alexander
describes how whiteness impacts social attitudes towards crime: "[S]tudies indicate
that white ex-offenders may actually have an easier time gaining employment than
African Americans without a criminal record. . . . Whiteness mitigates crime,
whereas blackness defines the criminal." MICHELLE ALEXANDER THE NEW JIM
CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 193 (2010).

14. Derrick Bell, Who's Afraid of Critical Race Theory, in THE DERRICK BELL
READER 78, 80 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2005).
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Existing social structures and institutions allow for change only
through what Derrick Bell has termed "interest convergence."' 5 Social
movements alone do not lead to racial justice, but rather "white elites
will tolerate or encourage racial advances for blacks only when such
advances also promote white self-interest."l 6 Bell explains that even
after policies have been put in place to create a semblance of racial
justice, "that remedy will be abrogated at the point that policymakers
fear the remedial policy is threatening the superior social status of
whites, particularly those in the middle and upper classes."" To
understand and undermine interest convergence in law, Critical Race
Theory emphasizes a "call to context" that requires a deeper
examination of legal and social issues by paying "attention to the
details of minorities' lives as a foundation for our national civil rights
strategy."' 8 Returning context to the legal conversation reveals the
role of law as both ideology and coercion, as "ideology convinces one
group that the coercive domination of another is legitimate." 9
From the foundation of Critical Race Theory, this Comment
examines legal decisions and policies which represent interest
convergence, preserve white privilege, and decontextualize the social
construction of race through post-racialism. Professor Sumi Cho
explains that post-racial ideology "reflects a belief that due to the
significant racial progress that has been made, the state need not
engage in race-based decision-making or adopt race-based remedies,
15. Bell draws the principle of interest convergence from court opinions
before and after Brown v. Board ofEducation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), providing "[t]he
interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it
convergences with the interests of whites." Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523
(1980). In other words, racial justice has been made dependent on the maintenance
of white privilege. Racial equality is not an absolute goal, but only merits
consideration if racial remedies "will secure, advance, or at least not harm societal
interests deemed important by middle and upper class whites." Id.; see also Lani
Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education
and the Interest-DivergenceDilemma, 91 J. AM. HIST. 92 (2004).
16. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 12, at xvii.
17. DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 69 (2004).

DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 12, at xviii.
19. Kimberld Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331, 1358 (1988).
18.
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and that civil society should eschew race as a central organizing
principle of social action." 20 Thus the "retreat from race" takes three
forms: materially in the removal of state created racial remedies,
socioculturally in redefining the meaning of racial equality and justice,
and politically in delegitimizing racial political entities in pursuit of
legal and social change. 2 1 Post-racialism has deep connections to
historic legal constructions of whiteness outlined by Lopez, but also
represents legal standards of whiteness. 2 2 Professor Cheryl Harris
explains that law has created a propertied investment in whiteness as
"the law's denial of the existence of racial groups is predicated not
only on the rejection of the ongoing presence of the past, but is also
grounded on a basic tenet of liberalism-that constitutional
protections inhere in individuals, not groups." 23 By burying the
language of race, post-racialism results in "the ultimate redemption of
whiteness: a sociocultural process by which whiteness is restored to its
full pre-civil-rights value . . . by disaggregating unjust enrichment and
complicity from whiteness through the redemptive and symbolic 'big
event' of racial transcendence." 24
To outline the features of post-racialism as a racial project that
forms the dominant narrative of modem legal and political rhetoric,
this Comment analyzes three Supreme Court cases and two pieces of
Arizona legislation using the four key features of post-racialism
outlined by Professor Cho. First is "the trope of racial progress [that
asserts] racial thinking and racial solutions are no longer needed
because the nation has 'made great strides,' achieved a[] historic
accomplishment, or transcended racial divisions of past
generations." 25 Second is a "race-neutral universalism" that casts
racial remedies as "partial and divisive, and benefiting primarily those
with 'special interests' versus all Americans." 26 In other words, the
United States is normatively defined as white, heterosexual, and male.
Those who want to change this norm, through affirmative action or
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Cho, supra note 8, at 1594.
Id.
See generally LOPEZ, supra note 9.
Harris, supra note 13, at 1761.
Cho, supra note 8, at 1596.
Id. at 1601.
Id. at 1602.
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examinations of the United States as historically oppressive to
disenfranchised groups, undermine the legal standing of equality the
United States.27 Third is a moral equivalence between racialism of the
past and present, making racial divisions of the past, such as Jim
Crow, synonymous with policies that attempt to effect racial remedies,
such as affirmative action. 2 8 Cho explains "[p]ost-racialism views
both the pre-civil-rights era (from European contact up to the midtwentieth century) and the civil-rights era (from the mid- to late
twentieth century) as racially polarizing. Instead, post-racialism
idealizes a society in which race is no longer a basis for differential
treatment, grievance, or remedy."2 9 Fourth is a distancing move, used
by post-racialists to distinguish themselves from and assert their
superiority over civil rights advocates and critical race theorists. 30 The
distancing move is a "hegemonic device" that features "attacks against
the preceding racialisms, especially against advocates of raceconscious theories, race-based remedies, and race-based collective
political action to achieve such remedies." 31
Each feature is a distinct strategy that defines post-racial ideology:
"[w]hile all four features are not required to define an instance of postracialism, they are central and common components of post-racialist
ideology and discourse." 32 In the next section, this Comment uses
Cho's four points of post-racialism to analyze Supreme Court
decisions in Regents v. Bakke,33 Grutter v. Bollinger,34 and Parents
Involved v. Seattle.35 These decisions form a precedent for the postracial narrative in law, showing an ideological shift in racial fortuity
of interest convergence as the Supreme Court moves further from
racial remedies of the past to colorblind and post-racial
understandings of equality.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id. at 1603.
Id.
Id. at 1604.
Id.
Id. at 1600.
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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II. POST-RACIAL PRECEDENT

Though post-racialism is a recent development, its ideological
roots are present in three major Supreme Court cases that have
dictated the state's interest in affirmative action and school
desegregation. While these are not the only cases to dictate the role of
race in legal decisions, they represent a distinct trend in creating a
dominant post-racial ideology, specifically related to race and
education. Cases such as McCleskey v. Kemp 36 and Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena37 show the operations of a post-racial
framework in capital sentencing and employment. McCleskey38
narrows understandings of racism to individual and intentional acts of
discrimination, rather than systemic inequalities, while Adarand3 9
solidifies the moral equivalence between Jim Crow and affirmative
action. This Comment focuses on majority opinions from Bakke,
Grutter,and ParentsInvolved, as they are three of the most significant
guideposts in generating a post-racial legal narrative in race and
education. Justice John Powell's opinion in Bakke establishes the
language of strict scrutiny in evaluating affirmative action within the
law,4 0 while Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's decision in Grutter
upholds affirmative action as a "compelling interest" in achieving
diversity in higher education. 4 1 Post-racialism emerges in Parents
Involved as the Court determines that racial diversity in schools can be
otherwise achieved through non-racial means.4 2
36. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
37. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
38. See generally Randall Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital
Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1388 (1988) (exploring the
race-of-the-victims disparities argued before the Court and the devaluation of black
lives by giving more lenient sentences to those who murder black people); Veronica
Patton, Rethinking Equal Protection Doctrine in the Wake of McCleskey v. Kemp,
11 NAT'L BLACK L. REv. 348 (1990) (analyzing the effects of McCleskey on equal
protection litigation and the requirement of "discriminatory effect").
39. See Cho, supra note 8, at 1615 (discussing the implications of Adarand in
future Supreme Court decisions: "[t]he Court declared all racial classifications
suspect 'irrespective of the race of the burdened or benefited group').
40. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
41. Cho, supra note 8, at 1617.
42. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 734-35 (2007).
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A. Regents of University of Californiav. Bakke
In the first major Supreme Court decision on affirmative action,
the Court held that affirmative action was a constitutional means to
further educational institutions' interests in attaining diversity, 43 but
the Court's reasoning was incredibly fractured. Alan Bakke sought
injunctive relief against the Regents of the University of California at
Davis after being denied admission to the school's medical program
for two consecutive years.4 Bakke alleged that the existence of
sixteen spots set aside for racial minority applicants restricted his
admission and thus, he was unjustly denied acceptance into the
program under the Equal Protection clause of the United States
Constitution.4 5 The California Supreme Court ruled that because the
program involved "racial classification," and even though the goal of
racially diversifying the medical school was a compelling state
interest, "the special admissions program was not the least intrusive
means of achieving these goals." 4 6
Once the United States Supreme Court heard the case, it issued a
"confusing, multifaceted decision." 4 7 In the Court's opinion, Justice
Powell held that the set-aside of sixteen applicant spots was
unconstitutional, but the state had a compelling interest in pursuing
diversity in a university setting. 48 Though not enough justices joined
in all parts of the opinion to form a majority opinion, Justice Powell's
opinion contains kernels of post-racial rhetoric that have been
exploited in later political discourse. A central component of Justice
Powell's argument is his understanding that
[t]he special admissions program is undeniably a classification
based on race and ethnic background.

. .

. Whether this limitation is

described as a quota or goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of race
and ethnic status.

..

. The guarantee of equal protection cannot

mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else

43.
44.
45.
46.

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20.
Id. at 276-77.
Id. at 278-79.
Id. at 279.
47. BELL, supra note 17, at 142.
48. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
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when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded
the same protection, then it is not equal.4 9
Justice Powell does not engage in the systemic discrimination that
occurs before the admissions process or the prevalence of racism in
United States society, underscored by Justice Marshall in his dissent,
because "racism of our society has been so pervasive that none,
regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact.""o
Instead, Justice Powell's decision codifies the narratives of racial
progress and moral equivocation through race-neutral universalism.
Justice Powell asserts "it cannot be said the government has any
greater interest in helping one individual than in refraining from
harming another. Thus, the government has no compelling
justification for inflicting such harm." 5 ' Justice Powell invokes Brown
v. Board of Education5 2 to define racially discriminatory harms,
creating a moral equivalence between the harm of removing sixteen
admissions spots from availability for white students with the harms
of school segregation and national disparate impact in educating black
students. Justice Powell indicts the role of "societal discrimination" as
vague, giving too much scope to "reach into the past,"' creating an
illusion of racial progress by narrowly defining racism to include any
specific acts of discrimination that have been overcome in the present.
The early post-racial arguments in Justice Powell's opinion
present the evolution of interest convergence in the eyes of the
Supreme Court. Though the state has a compelling interest and degree
of responsibility in achieving diversity within schools, it cannot be
made through distinctions based on race. Buried in the neutral tone of
Justice Powell's argument is what Thomas Ross terms "the rhetoric of
innocence" that states two effects to affirmative action plans:
They hurt innocent white people, and they advantage undeserving
black people.... Affirmative action does not merely do bad things
to good ('innocent') people nor merely do good things for bad

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 289-90.
Id. at 400 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 308-09.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 307.
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('undeserving') people; affirmative action does both at once and in
coordination.54
Bakke's rhetoric therefore sets a precedent for post-racialism in
creating a moral equivalence between the harms of affirmative action
and segregation through "white innocence" while upholding
affirmative action as a compelling state interest for diversifying state
universities.
B. Grutterv. Bollinger
Nearly twenty-five years after Bakke set out the precedent for
affirmative action discourse, another white student was rejected from
a professional degree program and sought an injunction. In 2003, the
Supreme Court heard the case of Grutter v. Bollinger, considering the
rejection of a white woman, petitioner Barbara Grutter, from the
University of Michigan Law School.55 Similar to Bakke, Grutter was
denied admission and argued that the affirmative action program in
place was a violation of Equal Protection. Unlike Bakke, the
University of Michigan had no selective system in place and instead
relied on a broad "commitment to racial and ethnic diversity with
special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have
been historically discriminated against." 56 The District Court drew on
the precedent set by Bakke to rule the program unconstitutional
because "'the attainment of a racially diverse class . . . was not
recognized as such by Bakke and it is not a remedy for past
discrimination."' 57 The Supreme Court upheld the use of affirmative
action in Michigan in a 5-4 decision, but used Bakke to outline an
argument for compelling state interest.
Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor drew
heavily on Justice Powell's decision in Bakke to reject any
justification for affirmative action rooted in historical disadvantage or
remedying present discrimination. In both cases, race in university
admissions is legal only in "the attainment of a diverse student
54. Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297,
301 (1990).
55. Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316-17 (2003).
56. Id. at 319.
57. Id. at 321.
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body."58 From Justice Powell's moral equivalence in Bakke, Justice
O'Connor seems assured of future racial progress because "raceconscious admission policies must be limited in time.... [A]ll
governmental uses of race must have a logical end point."59
The open use of interest convergence makes Grutter distinct.
Justice O'Connor holds that the state interest in pursuing diversity in
higher education comes from the benefits that may be gained for the
larger student population due to the
unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our
own, in which race unfortunately still matters. The Law School has
determined, based on its experience and expertise, that a 'critical
mass' of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further its
compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse
student body.60
Derrick Bell notes that Justice O'Connor's sudden advocacy for
affirmative action is a textbook example of interest convergence in the
law. Justice O'Connor "evidently viewed [affirmative action] as a
benefit and not a burden to nonminorities. In addition, it was a boost
to a wide range of corporate and institutional entities with which she
identifies." 6 1 Justice O'Connor's interest convergence logic relies on
race-neutral universalism to legitimize affirmative action, because a
more diverse student body is beneficial to the predominantly white
campus, and therefore outweighs the perceived harm of fewer white
students being admitted.
Justice O'Connor makes a pointed distinction between the use of
racial "quotas" and the use of "race as a 'plus' factor" in the
admissions process: "[A] university's admissions program must
remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an
individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity
the defining feature of his or her application. "62 Viewing race as a
"plus" returns to a propertied investment in whiteness, described by

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 324.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 333.
BELL, supra note 17, at 151.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
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Cheryl Harris, 63 by inhering constitutional protections in individuals
rather than groups. Doing so denies the background of racism that has
worked to systematically discriminate against groups based on race,
while again establishing a race-neutral universalism by touting the
individual as the core unit of legal analysis.
A rhetorical move that Justice O'Connor does not challenge, or
even acknowledge outside of summation, is the petitioner's claim that
the University of Michigan is "giving applicants who belong to certain
minority groups 'a significantly greater chance of admission than
students with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups."' 64
Much like the "white innocent" described by Ross, 65 the white
petitioner describing herself as a "disfavored racial group" embodies a
moral equivalence between the decline of white privilege and racism.
With whites defined as a "disfavored racial group," it rearticulates the
racial climate of the law to assume racial progress has been made to
the point that whites are now disadvantaged. Whites' "disfavored"
status represents white entitlement and a distancing move by
comparing
attempts
at
dismantling
whiteness
to
the
disenfranchisement of people of color; of course, for Grutter, the
present status of whites is worse.
C. ParentsInvolved v. Seattle
Just four years after the Supreme Court ruled on the role of race in
law school admissions, the issue of school desegregation was brought
before the court in the 2007 case Parents Involved v. Seattle.66
Combining cases based in Seattle, Washington, and Louisville,
Kentucky, the Supreme Court ruled on the ability of school districts to
utilize race as a factor to create racially integrated school districts in
areas that were historically racially segregated. In Seattle, this
integration took the form of a secondary tie breaker based on the
student's racial identification as white or non-white and the racial
makeup of the school. 67 However this tie breaker took place only once

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See generally Harris,supra note 13.
Id. at 317.
Ross, supra note 54, at 301.
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
Id. at 711-12.
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the more popular options were already taken and after students were
assigned based on the presence of a sibling in a desired school. 68 In
Louisville, the issue arose over the use of race in Jefferson County
school district, which would occasionally reassign students from
regional areas in order to assure a diverse school makeup. 69 While
Louisville was legally required to desegregate based on a federal court
decision in 1973,70 Seattle had no court-mandated school
desegregation. 7 1
The majority opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts contains all
four points in Sumi Cho's post-racial framework. Justice Roberts
begins by asserting the two standards used to determine compelling
state interest in using racial classifications: "remedying the effects of
past intentional discrimination" and the "interest of diversity in higher
education."7 2 From these narrow guidelines, Justice Roberts outlines
the trope of racial progress and race-neutral universalism by first
asserting that there is no compelling state interest in "racial balance,"
which Justice Roberts argues the Court has repeatedly found
unconstitutional.73 Instead, the state has a vested interest in diversity
in schools, which should not be racially defined, and in fact, "[w]hen
the actual racial breakdown is considered, enrolling students without
regard to their race yields a substantially diverse student body under
any definition of diversity." 74 Justice Roberts' opinion reflects a view
that racial progress has been achieved, because diversity seems to
occur naturally under "any definition," even though Justice Roberts
notes that Seattle suffers from "racially identifiable housing patterns
on school assignments."7 s
The language of racial progress and universalism in the Parents
Involved decision stems from earlier rulings in Grutter and Bakke. In
ParentsInvolved, however, Justice Roberts' opinion goes further than
past decisions by attacking previous uses of race in the law. Roberts'
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at710-1l.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 720, 722.
See id. at 726.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 712.
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opinion includes all four aspects of Professor Cho's post-racial
framework, including moral equivalence and distancing moves, which
were not evident in past decisions. Justice Roberts holds that
Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would
justify the imposition of racial proportionality throughout American
society .... Allowing racial balancing as a compelling end in itself
would effectively assur[e] that race will always be relevant in
American life, and that the ultimate goal of eliminating entirely
from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a
human being's race will never be achieved.76
According to Justice Roberts, not only has racial progress been
achieved, but the "racial balancing" that Seattle and Louisville attempt
to achieve by integrating schools distracts from the ultimate goal of
eliminating race from government. The precedent Justice Roberts
cites, and his own opinion itself, creates a distancing move in trying to
separate the present and future of racial rhetoric from the racialism of
the past by aspiring for the removal of race from society.
But despite the inherent injustice that Justice Roberts seems to
believe will occur if the two school districts attempt to use racial
balance to achieve diversity within schools, Justice Roberts argues
that the impacts are minor. "While we do not suggest that greater use
of race would be preferable, the minimal impact of the districts' racial
classifications on school enrollment casts doubt on the necessity of
using racial classifications."7 7 Justice Roberts' argument revives the
role of white innocence and interest convergence: it would be
unconstitutional to create racial balance within schools by using race,
yet the impact of racial classifications is so minimal it is unnecessary
to achieve racial balance in schools.7 8 Thus, there is no compelling
state interest because no general benefit can be linked to the benefit to
larger society or schools-in other words, white interests are no
longer served by racial integration. Moreover, racial integration now
disadvantages whites by taking places in schools desired by whites
and reserving them for others. Thus racial integration in schools has
been constructed as a violation of white innocence. By the conclusion
76. Id. at 730 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id. at 734.
7 8. Id.
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of the decision, Justice Roberts makes a final few points of moral
equivalence by directly citing Brown to affirm, not the desegregation,
but the de-integration of public schools:
It was not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally
separating children on the basis of race on which the Court relied to
find a constitutional violation in 1954.... Before Brown,
schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go to
school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these
cases have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we
should allow this once again-even for very different reasons.7 9
Justice Roberts' final statements punctuate a moral equivalence
that directly compares the present efforts in Seattle and Jefferson
County districts with the Jim Crow segregation that inspired Brown.
Key to Justice Roberts' argument is Justice Roberts' use of neutrally
worded language to refer to Brown. Stating that "schoolchildren" and
"children" were discriminated against based on the color of their skin
ignores the white supremacy that dictated school segregation, but also
permits Justice Roberts' post-racial interpretation of race in the law:
"The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race."80
Justice Roberts' majority opinion in Parents Involved marks the
first case in the new post-racial era of the courts, as it includes all four
aspects of post-racialism. Sumi Cho summarizes:
The post-racial era no longer needs to rely upon the racialized
language that was more evident prior to the Civil War. Instead,
courts rely on race-neutral legal mechanisms, especially increased
burdens of proof, and suggest a failure of proof on the part of racediscrimination plaintiffs. In the post-racial courts, the complex
machinations of the courts' evidentiary burden sleight-of-hand
achieves the racial hegemony sought on matters of racial
jurisprudence with far greater effectiveness."
Though the Court's decisions in Bakke and Grutter outline some key
points of post-racialism, they still affirm the role of race and
79. Id. at 746-47.
80. Id. at 748.
81. Cho, supra note 8, at 1620.
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affirmative action as necessary for achieving diversity, even if only
through interest convergence and white innocence. In Parents
Involved, Justice Roberts strikes out into new, but not unfounded,
territory that uses one of the most recognizable tunes in the catalogue,
Brown, to underscore his post-racial lyricism. Post-racialism becomes
law by burying the language of racism under narrow definitions of
state interest that remove mentions of race from legal discourse. With
the legal precedent for post-racialism in place, in the next section, this
Comment follows the themes of affirmative action and education to
analyze post-racial legislation in Arizona represented by H.B. 2281
and Proposition 107.
III. THE SOUTHWESTERN STRATEGY: POST-RACIALISM IN ARIZONA

After the Arizona Senate passed the infamous Support Our Law
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,. S.B. 1070,82 Arizona
became the seat for the "Southwestern Strategy" of post-racialism.
The Act created legal regulations on immigration targeted at the
Latina/o community through racial profiling and limiting access to
public services. 83 In the same way conservatives and neoconservatives
created a "Southern Strategy" that exploited white racial fears of
blacks to create voting strength in the south and win Republican
elections in the twentieth century, this Comment argues that the
Southwestern Strategy is a twenty-first century political move that
exploits white racial fears over Latina/o immigration to push postracial legislation in Arizona. Though S.B. 1070's full implementation
was denied through a federal injunction, 84 Proposition 107" and H.B.
228186 marked two major sections of an evolving post-racial narrative
in Arizona that has found public approval passing in 2010 elections.
Again using Sumi Cho's four points of post-racialism, this Comment
analyzes how Proposition 107 and H.B. 2281 perpetuate post-racial
rhetoric set by Supreme Court precedent while feeding on antiLatina/o tensions in Arizona.
82. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
83. Id.
84. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011).
85. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 36; ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 7.
86. H.B. 2281, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); see also ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 15-111 to -112 (2010).
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A. Proposition107
While the Supreme Court voiced its opinion on the status and use
of affirmative action in schools through Grutter,ballot measures arose
in different states to ban affirmative action. Advocates of California's
Proposition 209,87 Washington's Initiative 200,88 Michigan's Proposal
2,89 Nebraska's Initiative 424,90 and most recently Arizona's
Proposition 107, argue that "[a]ffirmative action is the moral
equivalent to Jim Crow segregation," and these "ballot initiatives to
ban affirmative action are presented and passed as 'civil rights
initiatives' in states with an overwhelming white majority of
registered voters."91 In California and Arizona, these "civil rights
initiatives" came on the heels of ballot initiatives and legislation
designed to exploit anti-immigrant narratives that play on white fears
of rising Latina/o populations. 92 While the Latino Threat Narrative
increases racial tensions by operating on a hegemonic understanding
of Latina/os as negative agents of change, 93 post-racialism attempts to
87. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, 1996 GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT PAMPHLET:
PROPOSITION 209 (1996), availableat http://vote96.sos.ca.gov/bp/209.htm.
88. WASH. SEC'Y OF STATE, 1998 ELECTION: STATE BALLOT MEASURES COMPLETE TEXT OF INITIATIVE 200 (1998), available at http://www.sos.wa.gov/
elections/1 998/i200_text.aspx.
89. MICH. SEC'Y OF STATE, NOTICE: STATE PROPOSALS, NOv. 7, 2006,
available at http://www.michigan.gov/
(2006),
GENERAL ELECTION 5

documents/sos/ED-138_StateProp_1 1-06_1742767.pdf.
90. NEB. SEC'Y OF STATE, INFORMATIONAL PAMPHLET: INITIATIVE MEASURE
#424 APPEARING ON THE 2008 GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT (2008), available at
http://www.sos.ne.gov/elec/2008/pdf/pamphlet%20424.pdf.
91. Cho, supra note 8, at 1615.
92. Key to the Latino Threat Narrative is the idea that Latina/os as a group
represent an "invading force .

.

. bent on reconquering the land that was formerly

theirs (the U.S. Southwest) and destroying the American way of life." LEO CHAVEZ,
THE LATINO THREAT: CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANTS, CITIZENS, AND THE NATION 2
(2008). Therefore the Latino Threat Narrative capitalizes on the growing Latina/o.
See generally id. (outlining of the history and present implications of the Latino
threat narrative, its role as a discourse of power, and common sense roots); Mary
Romero, Racial Profiling and Immigration Law Enforcement: Rounding Up of
Usual Suspects in the Latino Community, 32 CRITICAL Soc. 447, 459 (2006)
(discussing the Latino Threat Narrative as applied to Arizona law enforcement,
specifically the fear of mass Latin).

93. CHAVEZ, supra note 92, at 41.
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bury the role of racism in society, obscuring the racist roots of
legislation.
Arizona's Proposition 107 is the latest in the trend of ballot
initiatives. Proposition 107 used the language of moral equivalence by
amending the Arizona State Constitution to read: "This state shall not
grant preferential treatment to or discriminate against any individual
or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in
the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting." 94 Though not as explicit as the Supreme Court decisions,
these thirty-seven words effectively ban affirmative action in Arizona
and assume racial progress by ignoring the persistence of racism in the
United States while equating affirmative action measures and racial
discrimination. The proposed amendment passed with sixty-eight
percent approval, earning majority approval in every county in
Arizona except Apache County, 95 which occupies the northeastern
comer of the state and is predominantly American Indian. 96
Post-racial rhetoric emerges in full force through the statements of
proponents for Proposition 107 in the Arizona Ballot Proposition
Guide distributed by the Arizona Secretary of State. 97 Seventeen of
the proponents' statements offered a version of the phrase "regardless
of race or skin color," seven argued Proposition 107 promotes "equal
opportunity," four used a "hard work" bootstrap narrative of
overcoming obstacles, and three directly quoted Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr. in arguing against affirmative action. 98
One proponent of Proposition 107, State Representative Steve
Montenegro, combined the Latino Threat Narrative and a post-racial
narrative in citing his family history of "legal" immigration to the
United States from El Salvador, and applying the rhetoric of legality
-

94.

ARIZ. CONST.

art. II,

§ 36.

95. ARIz. SEC'Y OF STATE, STATE OF ARIZONA OFFICIAL CANVASS: 2010
GENERAL
ELECTION
14
(2010),
available at http://www.azsos.gov/

election/20 10/General/Canvass201 0GE.pdf.
96. In Apache County, 72.9% identify as American Indian or Alaska Native.
State & County Quick Facts: Apache County, Arizona, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan.
31, 2012), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/04/04001.html.
97.

REVIEW:

ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE, BALLOT PROPOSITIONS & JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE

PUBLICITY

PAMPHLET

33,

34-47

(2010),

available

at

http://www.azsos.gov/election/2010/info/pubpamphlet/english/e-book.pdf.
98. Id. at 34-37.
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to affirmative action: "Can you imagine if someone wanted to
LEGALIZE racial or sexual discrimination?" 99 Another proponent of
Proposition 107, Ward Connerly, the president of the American Civil
Rights Coalition, went so far as to argue that "America was founded
on the principle of equality," and even though there was historical
discrimination "we have struggled mightily over the years to extend
the blessings of freedom and equality to all men and women in our
nation." 00
Beginning with a narrative of race-neutral universalism, Connerly
asserted racial progress by contending that affirmative action and
"preferences for some" must come to an end.' 0 ' Each of Connerly's
statements morally equates affirmative action programs with
discrimination, frequently co-opting the language of civil rights. In his
statement promoting Proposition 107, Tom Home, the present
Attorney General for the State of Arizona, quoted the "quality of ...
character" from Dr. King's 1963 speech in Washington, asserting that
non-racial, non-gendered individuality is a "fundamental value" of the
United States.102 The moral equivalence evident in these statements is
dependent on race-neutral universalism that incites the distancing
move proposed by Connerly, Home, and other advocates for
Proposition 107. Many of the statements hypothesize what opponents
may say about affirmative action or its benefits, with Montenegro
drawing the direct parallel between advocates of affirmative action
and segregationists.' 0 3 According to Montenegro, not only are
advocates of affirmative action wrong, but they are also creating racial
preferences that "convince entire generations that they were not good
enough or smart enough to compete." 104
The proponents of Proposition 107 used political rhetoric to
attempt to seize the moral high ground from racial justice advocates
by asserting a post-racial framework that is not ignorant of history, but
rather strategically selective about which aspect of history it
acknowledges. No mention of affirmative action by advocates of
99. See id. at 34.
100. Id. at 35.
10 1. Id.
102. Id. at 34.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Proposition 107 goes without moral equivocation between
segregation, Jim Crow, or affirmative action.10 5 Moreover, the
proponents' statements exploit the language of the civil rights
invoking "reverse
movement to re-center whiteness by
discrimination" and creating the presumption of white innocence.' 06
Under this logic, not only are whites being victimized by affirmative
action or "racial preference programs," but these post-racialists also
portray themselves as the vanguard of a new civil rights movement,
distancing themselves by invoking the words of past civil rights
leaders and constitutional rhetoric. 0 7 The language of racism and race
is buried with post-racialism, intentionally masking ongoing racial
tension in Arizona and perpetuating anti-immigration rhetoric despite
their supposed commitment to justice.
B. H.B. 2281: Tom Horne's "Downer"
In a discussion on CNN with Anderson Cooper and Professor
Michael Eric Dyson, then-Arizona State Superintendent Tom Home
invoked the legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. to defend his
proposed policy to ban ethnic studies programs in Arizona. Home
claimed that ethnic studies programs "divide[] students up by race"
and teach students of color the "downer that they're oppressed."1 08
Home's statements reflect the post-racial agenda that denies the
presence of racism in the United States because it is the "land of
opportunity." The legislature passed the Arizona ethnic studies ban in
the fall legislative session as H.B. 2281, amending the Arizona
Revised Statutes to read:
The legislature finds and declares that public school pupils should
be taught to treat and value each other as individuals and not be
taught to resent or hate other races or classes of people.

. .

. A

school district or charter school in this state shall not include in its
program of instruction any courses or classes that include any of the
105. Id.
106. See Ross, supra note 54, at 301.
107.

ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 97, at 34-37.

108. Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees: Arizona's New Controversy (CNN
television broadcast Dec. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Cooper] (transcript available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANS CRIPTS/1005/12/acd.02.html).
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following: 1. Promote the overthrow of the United States
government. 2. Promote resentment toward a race or class of
people. 3. Are designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic
group. 4. Advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of
pupils as individuals.' 09
H.B. 2281 is a clear example of post-racial advocacy. H.B. 2281
declares the discussion of race in public schools taboo and
discriminatory, and the learning of the United States' history of
oppression treacherous and seditious. Central to H.B. 2281, and Tom
Home's statements, is an emphasis on treating students as individuals,
continuing the individualist rhetoric of Supreme Court decisions on
affirmative action, and reaffirming the propertied investment of
whiteness in the law. The statute's neutral wording prohibits teaching
children to "resent other races or classes of people" while treating
them as individuals. This wording is a distancing move; an effort to
shatter group solidarity in the pursuit of racial justice. At its core, H.B.
2281 is a trope of racial progress that assumes the histories of
oppression taught in ethnic studies programs are not connected to
modem experiences of people of color. Furthermore, H.B. 2281
assumes the histories are not truthful or accurate portrayals of the
United States, and are dangerous to the mindset of students.
H.B. 2281 and Home present an interest convergence view of
history, turning the law to an ideology of post-racialism that attempts
to censor ethnic studies classes that would "[p]romote resentment
toward a race or class of people."' 10 Here the white innocent returns,
but not in the removal of privilege through affirmative action
described by Ross."' Instead, it appears in the acknowledgment of
white supremacy as a defining feature of United States history.
Without naming race in the main text of the resolution, H.B. 2281
protects white supremacy as a form of power by shielding the
historical mechanisms by which it has taken power. In other words,
the language of the bill gives the Superintendent of Public Instruction
the power to target and eliminate any teachings about United States
history that could be interpreted as resentment towards wealthy white
men who have dominated the course of United States history.
109. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-111 to -112 (2010).
110. Id.
Ill. Ross, supra note 54, at 301.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol48/iss2/8

22

Chin: What a Load of Hope: The Post-Racial Mixtape

2012]

WHAT A LOAD OF HOPE:THE POST-RACIAL MIXTAPE

391

Removing ethnic studies programs from schools is post-racialists'
attempt to disconnect students from historical knowledge that can
generate critical consciousness. As Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres
note, such knowledge has transformative power:
[C]onsciousness of race has, for many people of color, functioned
as a form of political literacy, both affirmatively connecting
individuals to a group and critically assessing the conditions of the
group in light of larger structures within the society. It may
encourage them not only to see but also to act.1 12
Post-racialism is antithetical to movements for racial justice
because it recognizes the power of race-based collective struggle,
categorically labels the struggle as negative, and asserts a race-neutral
ideology that buries the past under strategic ignorance. During
Home's CNN interview, Home borrows statements from students in
Arizona ethnic studies classes, such as "[n]ow that I took the course, I
realized that I'm oppressed," and uses these statements to argue that
the students learn the "downer" that they are oppressed through these
classes. 113 According to Home, not only has racial progress been
achieved by eliminating Arizona's ethnic studies programs, but to
assert anything otherwise is damaging to the health and wellbeing of
students in the educational system. Home uses Paulo Freire's
Pedagogy of the Oppressed as an example of literature that would
undermine the legitimacy of ethnic studies programs. In doing so,
Home seeks to claim moral high ground for the work of post-racial
advocates, while distancing the work of racial justice scholars such as
Freire, Guinier, or Torres and disclaiming their work as racist and
antithetical to equality."14
However broad and sweeping H.B. 2281 is, buried in the legal
code is a final disclaimer that helps to insulate post-racial rhetoric
from claims of discrimination, especially when dealing with the
112. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING
RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 104 (2002).

113. Cooper, supra note 108.
114. Id. Instead of engaging scholars like Freire, Guinier, or Torres, or other
academic work discussing the issues and problems of people of color, Home turns
their scholarship into the problem itself, discounting their work without any
discussion or identification of the underlying issues that these scholars are trying to
speak to or combat. Id.
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content of education. Subsection E asserts that restrictions do not
apply to Federal Indian Law, tracking that may produce "disparate
impact by ethnicity," teaching "controversial aspects of history," or
histories of "any ethnic group" are key functions of post-racial legal
framing.s15 The demonization of ethnic studies classes, which
"promote resentment" while not restricting or prohibiting "the
instruction of the holocaust, any other instance of genocide or the
historical oppression of a particular group of people" is a rhetorical
move to limit the way classes are taught.1 6 While teaching the history
of oppression is not restricted, the "resentment" returns to the white
innocent that may be damaged by learning histories of oppression in a
certain tone or through certain scholars. The individualizing of
students and the selective teaching of history advocated by H.B. 2281
is a surgical historical erasure, attempting to sever historical
connections between white supremacy, capitalism, and the oppression
of people of color.
IV.WHAT A LOAD OF

HOPE'l7: POST-RACIAL TRAUMA AND THE
SEARCH FOR JUSTICE

Post-racialism has integrated itself into legal ideology as a
legitimate reading of race, discrimination, and education in the United
States. It has evolved into a modern political rhetoric that combats
antiracist efforts through what Ian Haney Lopez describes as a "new,
well-honed jujitsu of reactionary colorblindness in action: Exploit race
(use coded terms to stir up racial animosity); parry (brush aside
charges of racism by demanding proof that you used an old-fashioned

115.

ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 15-112(E) (2010).

116. Id. § 15-112(A), (F).
117. The phrase "load of hope" was originally used in a laundry detergent
marketing campaign to symbolize the hope of clean clothes for victims of Hurricane
Katrina. Tide, Tide Loads of Hope, YOuTUBE (Mar. 9, 2009), http://youtu.be/1KyjsRFW9Y. In Dr. Romero's Racial Justice course at Arizona State University, it
became an ironic phrase representing a sort of naive idealism, untruth, or
misrepresentation that, in this case, is negative and destructive to efforts for racial
justice. Hope is uplifting, important and crucial to any aspect of life. When postracial rhetoric is used to negate the histories and lived experiences of people of color
under the assumption equality has been achieved and oppression no longer exists in
any form, it is not just a load of untruth, hogwash, or manure, it is a "load of hope."
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slur); punch (accuse your critics of constantly playing the race
card).""'

The four features of post-racialism that Sumi Cho outlinesll 9
become instructive in identifying the rhetorical and legal strategies
used to insulate white supremacy from challenges through a postracial narrative. Post-racialism, however, makes a distinct departure
from reactionary colorblindness in its moral equivalence and
distancing move. If reactionary colorblindness is the hand-to-hand
jujitsu of conversational white supremacy, then post-racialism,
through legislation and common law, is the heavy artillery. Postracialism attacks communities from a distance while those in power sit
comfortably, insulated, due to the elimination of programs,
opportunities, and histories of people of color.
Post-racialism, in the law and in political rhetoric, feeds people of
color a "load of hope" that racism is dead. Post-racialists foist this
load of hope on people of color by acknowledging the history of
oppression, and morally equating any programs, organizations, or
people that strive for racial justice with discrimination. This creates
''post-racial trauma"; a dissonance between the experiences of racism
that people of color face daily and the legal and political language that
asserts the United States has transcended race. Indigenous Scholar of
Education Bryan Brayboy argues that historical trauma, or the
cumulative emotional and psychological damage that occurs across
generations from massive group trauma, is deeply connected to
"genesis amnesia," or forgetting the beginning.120 In contrast, postracial trauma comes from laws and political rhetoric that acknowledge
the history of oppression in the United States, but deny that said
history has meaning, value, or impact on the present experiences of
people of color. When Tom Home states that ethnic studies programs
that utilize the pedagogy of the oppressed are a "downer," or the
Supreme Court rules that affirmative action programs that tread on
white privilege in school admissions is the same as segregation, a
twisted history of the United States becomes institutionalized. This
118.

Ian Haney Lopez, Blind Spot: How Reactionary Colorblindness Has

Infected Our Courts -

and Our Politics, AM.

PROSPECT (Mar. 9, 2011),

http://prospect.org/article/blind-spot-0.
119. Cho, supra note 8, at 1601-04.
120.

Bryan

Brayboy,

Unpacking Remembrances, AM.

EDUC.

RES.

J.,

(forthcoming 2012).
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twisted history recognizes that oppression existed (maybe, once upon
a time), but claims it is no longer relevant.
Post-racialism creates post-racial trauma by connecting the
institutional racism codified in the law to the everyday experiences of
people of color by denying that these experiences are painful, have
meaning, or are related to any form of systemic discrimination. The
prohibition of ethnic studies programs, and other post-racial projects,
attempts to bury the potential for empowerment in race
consciousnessl 2 1 by removing the explicit language of racism from the
law and reviving oppression through race-neutral universalism and
assertions of racial progress. Post-racial laws define racism through
overt individual acts of meanness, acts that do not connect to the
institutions of the status quo. These laws also deny the presence of
racial microagressions,1 22 and equate racism with affirmative action or
ethnic studies education. Post-racialism as a legal ideology makes the
law hostile to racial reform and thus makes post-racialism appear
eternal.
Yet youth, the supposed victims of Tom Home's "downer,"
generally don't believe the hype of post-racialism. The Applied
Research Center found that the "millennial" generation believes that
systemic racism and race continue to matter in United States society,
based on focus group interviews conducted with people ages eighteen
to twenty-five of White, Asian American/Pacific Islander, Black, and
Latina/o descent.123 Across the five identified racial groups, a majority
of respondents believe racism remains a significant problem in the
criminal justice system and in employment, and a majority of
respondents believe racism is still a significant problem in education,
except for a majority of white respondents.1 24 Most of the
interviewees expressed concern with problems of inequitable access to
education or the ongoing segregation in schools. Yet while the youth
121. See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 112.
122. See generally Daniel Solorzano et al., Critical Race Theory, Racial
Microagressionsand Campus Racial Climate: The Experiences ofAfrican American
College Students, 69 J. NEGRO EDUC. 60 (2000) (exploring the role of racial
microagressions in educational settings).
123. Dominique Apollon, Don't Call Them "Post-Racial": Millenials'
Attitudes on Race, Racism, and Key Systems in Our Society, APPLIED RESEARCH
CTR. 4 (June 2011), http://arc.org/millennials/report/.
124. Id. at 12.
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talk about getting an education through college degrees, diplomas, and
careers, there was little focus on how education itself can be a tool,
process, or way of knowing, used to combat racism. Researchers
found respondents are hesitant to describe how systemic racism
works, exists, or functions, but can more easily describe interpersonal
acts of meanness and systemic issues of class.' 2 5 This paucity of
dialogue can be seen as one of the main symptoms of post-racial
trauma, reducing racism to individualized acts, while the systemic
post-racial rhetoric obscures, obfuscates, and otherwise obviates the
need for formalized changes. While youth recognize that such
problems may exist, they experience difficulty in communicating
ideas or feelings about structural problems. These difficulties could be
mended through the very kind of programs that Home, H.B. 2281, and
Proposition 107 are attempting to erase.
The kind of education that H.B. 2281 targets, such as the ethnic
studies program in the Tucson Unified School District, provides the
type of language to talk openly about race, structural oppression, and
systemic racism. In a report funded by the Arizona State
Superintendent's office,1 26 an independent auditor found that the
Mexican American Studies Department (MASD) in Tucson provided
higher student-teacher interaction, improved student achievement
through the curriculum, and even complied with the vague language
of H.B. 2281.127 Although MASD courses included readings on
Latina/o history and LatCrit, the report's primary concern28 was that
125. Id. at 26.
126. Formerly run by Tom Home, the Superintendent's office was the very
office that sought to dismantle ethnic studies, specifically Mexican American
Studies in Tucson based on the focus of an audit and Horne's repeated emphasis on
Mexican American Studies in public comments to dismantle ethnic studies as an
example of the negative effects of ethnic studies programs. See Cooper, supra note
108.
127. CAMBHUM LEARNING, CURRICULUM AUDIT OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN
STUDIES DEPARTMENT TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 47 (2011) (on file with
author).
128. Id. at 36. The report also looked at books that had been marked as
"questionable texts," reading the books based on quotes provided to the auditors. In
reviewing the text, the report includes quotes marked as "controversial," both of
which would imply violence against whites when taken out of context. However, the
report includes both quotes in context, the first is a historical account of violence
undertaken by Texas authorities in 1915, while the second quotes a 1969 rally when
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such readings were not "age appropriate" based on the complexity of
the content. 129 However, high rates of achievement reported in the
audit show that coursework provided open discourse on race, history,
and oppression in the classroom and students were not only engaged
in the coursework, but engaged in education at higher rates, which
indicated that students turn racial and political literacy into action.
Post-racialism seeks to individualize students, eliminate group
affiliations, and rearticulate the rhetoric of civil rights to make claims
to universal personhood incompatible with the goals of racial equity.
Cooptation into interest convergence becomes simple and ingrained
into race-related legislation since whiteness is taken as the normative
position of power and victimization. Harms are typically localized to
disparate impact on privileged whites rather than oppressed and
disenfranchised people of color. Sumi Cho reiterates that the power to
overcome post-racialism as an ideology lies in collective action, citing
the work of Immanuel Wallerstein and Andre Gunder Frank in
advocating for the formation of a large-scale social movement to
combat post-racial attitudes and oppressions. "Only by empowering
the various understrata may the existing undemocratic structures be
weakened."130
Coalitions between racial groups empower people of color, and
everyone involved, by giving them greater political voice, and can
help combat post-racial trauma by reaffirming experiences of
oppression as valid. Importantly, coalitions provide a space for
discussion that does not distance or disregard experiences with racism
as being "too sensitive" or "over analyzing" encounters. This sort of
empowerment not only begins in schools, through ethnic studies
programs that have been banned by a post-racial agenda, but also by
refining academic discourse through "political impact statements . . . ,
[which] ascertain how well one's projects and ideas align with . . .
larger project[s] and goals in the medium run and . . . anticipate

hazards along the way."'31

a promise to stampede "gringo" was used as a call to action against white
supremacy. Id.
129. Id.
130. Cho, supra note 8, at 1648.
131. Id. at 1649.
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By generating coalitions against post-racial ideology, people of
color can generate a critical mass to respond to historic and present
oppression. Rather than the "critical mass" used to justify token
representation of people of color in the interest of diversity, critical
mass coalition building strives to generate a larger social network that
can blossom into a social movement, creating a new beat, tune, and
song that challenges the post-racial mixtape; reminding everyone, like
Kanye West has, that "racism's still alive, they just be concealing it."
Post-racialism has gathered acclaim by sampling the ideals and
rhetoric of the civil rights movement, but like an old cassette, the tune
has become warped, twisting and morphing the words into hollow
support of people of color while reinforcing a white supremacist beat.
Coalition building is less destructive, and more creative, sampling the
old tune to reinforce the old message, adding current relevance by
connecting the old beats and the modem style into an effort that can
expose the post-racial mixtape for what it is: a load of hope.
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